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Abstract 
Based on the self-generated attitude change model, a 
process constraint treatment analogue was investigated. 
Differential treatment effects were explored for people that 
are verbalizers and visualizers. It was predicted that 
people who participated in the process constraint condition 
would benefit more if they were verbalizers than 
visualizers. It was also predicted that there would be no 
difference in effects for people in the control condition. 
To test these predictions, people with a fear of speaking in 
public were asked to speak in front of a small group. The 
effects of the treatment conditions were assessed using 
self-report, behavioral, and physiological measures of fear. 
Results supported the predictions on the behavioral and 
physiological measures, but only in part on the self-report 
measures. Implications of these results are discussed as 
well as directions for future research. 
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Process Constraint 
What is Self-Generated Attitude Change? 
Traditionally, changes in attitude have been 
conceptualized as a response to outside information 
(i.e., from the environment). A new focus of attitude 
change has questioned the assumption that changes in 
attitude usually results from external sources or from the 
environment. It is entirely possible that these changes 
arise from a reassessment of one's attitudes regardless of 
the addition of new facts (Tesser, 1978). The process for 
this self-generated change in attitude would be simply 
thinking about an object. 
The idea of self-generated attitude change stems from 
(a) the relationship between beliefs and attitudes and (b) 
the effects of thought on beliefs or beliefs. A belief can 
be looked at as an impression or an idea about an object. 
1 
An attitude can be thought of as an appraisal of a 
particular object or feelings connected with the object. An 
operational definition of attitudes "involves asking the 
person to assign the object of thought to a position on some 
dimension of judgement ••. dimensions can be thought of as 
evaluations" (McGuire 1985, p. 239). Tesser (1978) felt that 
a person's attitude is partially determined by their 
beliefs. Therefore, changes in one's beliefs would result 
in a change of attitude. 
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Basically, the process that links beliefs and 
attitudes is thought. The way in which people think about 
their beliefs and ideas can change their attitudes. Tesser 
(1978) stated "thought does not involve a passive view of a 
static object but, rather, a dynamic process which alters 
the salient cognitive representation of that object" (p. 
330) . Thought tends to make beliefs evaluative1y 
consistent. If thought will cause a person's beliefs to be 
more congruent, then this process would affect one's 
feelings about an object. This change in affect is a 
polarization of feelings (i.e., favorable attitudes become 
more favorable, and unfavorable attitudes become more 
unfavorable). 
Thus, increased thought should generally change beliefs 
to be more consistent. With additional thought, feelings 
that are initially positive should become more positive and 
feelings that are initially negative should become more 
negative. In a study by Sadler and Tesser (1973), the 
effects of thought on affect were examined. Subjects were 
exposed to a "likeable" or "dislikeable" person (p. 101). 
Their attitude or impression toward this person became more 
extreme if they were given time to think rather than being 
distracted. The strengthening of their initial feelings 
occurred for both positive and negative feelings. Assuming 
that beliefs about an object can affect attitudes because of 
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introspective examination, it follows that feelings will 
become more polarized or extreme the longer a person 
reflects about an object. Tesser and Conlee (1975) found 
that the longer a person thought about an object or issue in 
the absence of any external information, the more polarized 
their feelings became toward the object. 
How Thought Effects Beliefs 
Given that thought causes polarization of one's 
evaluation or affect, knowing how it occurs becomes 
important. Different hypotheses have been suggested to 
explain the manner in which thought influences beliefs. One 
explanation is the "generation" hypothesis which dictates 
that a person can add new beliefs to be congruous with the 
existing beliefs (Sadler & Tesser, 1973, p. 101). In the 
Sadler and Tesser study, subjects given time to think about 
their partner (whether the partner was likable or not) 
tended to list more attitude consistent beliefs than did 
those subjects that were not given a chance to reflect on 
their attitudes. 
Further evidence for the generation hypothesis was 
demonstrated in the Tesser and Cowan study (1975) on 
impression formation. They set up conditions in which it 
would be difficult or easy to generate new beliefs. Their 
reasoning was that it would be more difficult to generate 
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new consistent beliefs given many initial trait adjectives 
than given few trait adjectives. Thus, a greater amount of 
polarization of feelings was expected with few initial trait 
adjectives that with many initial trait adjectives. The 
results of this study showed that given time to think about 
a person, polarization was much higher when there were few 
initial trait adjectives compared with many initial trait 
adjectives. Overall, there seems to be much evidence that 
points toward the generation hypothesis. 
The "reinterpretation" hypothesis is another 
explanation of the process by which thought alters beliefs 
and, in turn, alters affect (Tesser & Cowan, 1977, p. 217). 
Tesser and Cowan created treatment conditions that contained 
ambiguous trait adjectives. An ambiguous trait adjective 
was one in which there could be a wide range of meanings. 
While musing over different alternatives, ambiguous trait 
adjectives can be reinterpreted to be more consistent with 
other trait adjectives. The results of this study showed 
that ambiguous adjectives were judged more positively when 
in a positive set of descriptions and were judged more 
negatively when in a negative set of descriptions. Thus, 
when given an ambiguous situation people may reinterpret 
their beliefs, thereby polarizing their feelings. 
An additional possibility suggested by Tesser (1978) is 
a blocking process in which inconsistent beliefs are 
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suppressed. More specifically, an individual may discount 
or discard any information that does not seem congruous with 
their particular line of reasoning. Stated another way, a 
rejection of inconsistent beliefs can result in a set of 
beliefs that are evaluatively consistent. 
However, the thought process of each individual is 
idiosyncratic. Thus there could be many other processes 
possible. In general, thinking about an issue, idea or 
object can result in a group of beliefs which are 
evaluatively consistent. 
Under What Conditions Does Polarization Occur? 
Thought has now been linked to altering people's 
beliefs which in turn can polarize attitudes or affect. 
However, most of the aforementioned studies were performed 
in the absence of any external information, in a vacuum of 
sorts. Without any external information, there remains 
little chance of people testing the validity of their 
beliefs. 
If the object of people's thought is present, people 
can realistically assess their beliefs. Moreover, people 
would probably adapt their beliefs to reflect the object. 
Having the object present serves as a "reality constraint" 
because the chances of misrepresentation are reduced 
(Tesser, 1976, p.184). Placing a reality constraint on 
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people restricts the extent to which beliefs can be 
generated, reinterpreted, or discounted. In contrast, the 
absence of an object would allow people to polarize their 
affect because there would not be any evidence in which to 
check the validity of their beliefs. 
6 
Tesser (1976) looked at the effects of reality 
constraints on attitudes about paintings. Subjects were 
asked how they felt about various paintings two times. In 
between these evaluations, some subjects were instructed to 
perform a distraction task to decrease the amount of thought 
that could be done. Other subjects were asked to think 
about a painting without it being displayed. A third group 
was asked to think about a painting while it was displayed. 
The results for the female subjects showed the most 
amount of polarization occurring in the condition in which 
the object was absent. The condition with the painting 
present produced less polarization than the condition in 
which it was absent. The least amount of polarization was 
in the condition in which subjects performed a distraction 
task. Thus, the results were consistent with the idea that 
reality constraints tends to reduce affect by limiting the 
consistency of the beliefs. That is, thought causes beliefs 
to be more consistent and subsequently cause attitudes to be 
more extreme. Alternatively, by constraining thought, 
beliefs become somewhat ambivalent. The result is reduced 
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attitude extremity or attitude polarization. 
In addition to reality constraints "process 
constraints" have been found to reduce polarization of 
feelings (Tesser, 1978, p. 326). Reality constraints 
originate from obvious evidence about the object or external 
information. Process constraints, on the other hand, 
originate from internal information (i.e., standards and 
rules). A process constraint requires people to examine the 
origins of their beliefs. The idea underlying process 
constraints is that people attempt to be rational. When 
people are asked to explicitly state the origins of their 
beliefs, they might discover there are inconsistencies. If 
while looking at the derivations of their beliefs people 
find some irrational beliefs, they would probably adjust 
their beliefs to be more rational. As a result, these 
beliefs become more inconsistent or ambivalent. Some of 
the intensity of the affect associated with the beliefs is 
reduced. (i.e., a decrease in polarization occurs). 
Clinical Applications 
How does the idea of attitude change relate to clinical 
problems? Consider, for example, phobias. Some of the 
criterion for social phobias the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual III-R includes are: exposure to the specific phobic 
stimulus provokes immediate anxiety, phobic situation is 
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avoided or endured with intense anxiety, and the person 
recognizes that the fear is excessive or unreasonable 
(1987). Also, there is a persistent fear of one or more 
situations in which a person is exposed to possible scrutiny 
by others and fears s/he may do something or act in a way 
that will be humiliating or embarrassing. 
In some ways, a phobia is like an attitude. When 
experiences are unpleasant or negative, people will 
probably attempt to avoid the whole situation or object. 
Without any more exposure to the stimulus, people will not 
have any reality checks to assess the rationality of their 
beliefs. In other words, the more people think about the 
negative aspects of an experience the fearful they may 
become. People's beliefs will become increasingly 
consistent yet irrational and their feelings become 
polarized (i.e., extremely negative). In sum, the 
development of phobias can be thought of in terms of self 
generated attitude change. That is, in the absence of 
contact with the object and with increased thought, phobic 
reactions can emerge. 
Hypothesizing about the development of phobias in terms 
of self-generated attitude change has implications for 
intervention. Process constraints could be utilized by 
simply asking a person about the origin of the phobia and 
the rationale behind it. In this way, a person might 
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realize that the basis of his fear is not thoroughly logical 
or rational. These beliefs will be discredited, thereby 
reducing the exaggerated affect associated with it (i.e., 
reducing the polarized negative feelings). In many studies, 
process constraints have been examined for use in 
ameliorating phobias. 
Constrained Thought vs. Unconstrained Thought 
One of the original experiments that studied process 
constraints was done by Tesser, Leone, and Clary (1978). 
Their study concentrated on women with a fear of public 
speaking. The subjects were given one of three treatment 
conditions: a condition that utilized process constraints, 
one that had an affective focus, or a control condition. 
In the process constraint condition, the experimenter 
asked the subject to concentrate on why she felt 
uncomfortable about speaking in public. For example, "why 
do you feel this way ••. in what way are these beliefs 
logically related to your emotions, past experiences ••• " (p. 
269). In the affective focus condition, women were asked 
what emotions they felt when speaking in public. For 
example, " we're not concerned with why you feel this 
way, but how you feel •.• " (p, 270). In the control 
condition, subjects were asked to perform a task in which 
they indicated anxiety levels on particular topics. 
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After a five minute relaxation exercise, the 
participants were asked to speak to the other subjects twice 
about a particular topic. After each speech, three 
measures were taken: a self report measure, a behavioral 
measure and a physiological response. On the self report, 
subjects were asked questions about their emotions, their 
performance, and pleasantness of the experience. They were 
also asked of how they usually felt after a performance 
compared to the present and their opinion of the 
effectiveness of the treatment. The behavioral measure was 
very similar to the self report taken. The only difference 
was that the audience (the other subjects) filled out the 
measure in response to the speaker's (the subject's) affect. 
The physiological measure was a palmar sweat test. Sweat 
from the subjects' index finger on their dominant hand was 
measured just before and just after the talk. 
The self-reports revealed the anxiety level in the 
process condition to be the lowest of any conditions. The 
control condition was next, and the affective condition 
produced the most anxiety. Using the physiological 
responses, arousal for the subjects in the process condition 
was the lowest. The control condition was not much higher, 
but the affective condition was again very high. The 
behavioral component showed no variability between the 
conditions, probably due to the inconsistency of audience 
judgement. 
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These results confirm much of the hypothesized effects 
of process constraints. Searching for the origins of 
people's thought tended to reduce their fear of public 
speaking. Essentially, through examination and constriction 
of their irrational beliefs, the subjects' associated affect 
was "depolarized." In contrast, the anxiety levels of the 
affective condition was closely aligned with the self 
generated attitude change model. Focusing on the affect 
tended to increase the subjects feeling of fear instead of 
reducing the anxiety. In part, this polarization occurred 
by not allowing a more corrective cognitive experience. 
Much like the results of Tesser (1976) subjects affect was 
"depolarized" when thinking about the reality of their 
beliefs. 
The results of this study have been replicated in other 
studies (Leone, 1984~ Leone & Baldwin, 1983~ Leone, Minor, & 
Baltimore, 1983). Combinations of constrained thought have 
been utilized (i.e., process and reality constraints 
together). The combination of process and reality 
constraints seemed to increase approach behavior to the 
feared stimulus and increase self efficacy. Also, the 
longer people thought with reality and process constraints 
about the feared stimulus the more strongly they believed 
they would be able to cope with their fears in the future. 
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The results of these studies were found with different 
fears, different dependent variables, and different 
settings. For example, both fear of speaking in front of a 
group and fear of snakes have been tested. Also, several 
dependent variables such as behavioral approach (Lang & 
Lozovik, 1963), self-efficacy, and physiological arousal 
have been utilized. In addition, different studies have 
utilized different experimenters and different locations. 
Assimilating all these results, it seems that 
constrained thought and unconstrained thought can be seen to 
be a linear process. Thinking in a manner that restricts 
exaggerated beliefs decreases anxiety. Thinking in a manner 
that allows exaggerated thought to become more consistent 
and extreme can increase anxiety. In sum, constrained 
thought is associated with the reduction of anxiety, and 
unconstrained thought can be associated with an increase in 
anxiety. 
Individual Differences 
Thus far, studies have also shown that placing 
constraints on people's thought processes decreases the 
extent to which people can make their beliefs consistent 
(Leone et al., 1983~ Tesser et al., 1978). Consequently, 
constraints reduce people's polarized feelings. Given that 
thought is the key to polarized feelings, the concept of 
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individual styles of thought becomes important. 
Individual differences in cognitive style could affect 
the efficacy of treatment outcomes. The ultimate goal for 
clinical and research purposes is to match individual styles 
to appropriate treatments for the most effective results 
possible. "Aptitude-treatment interaction is directed 
toward identifying client variables that predict 
differential treatment responsiveness ••• the most research on 
client type by treatment interactions have been conducted 
with the anxiety disorders" (Dance & Neufeld, 1988 p. 192-
194). Several individual difference variables have been 
examined. Dance and Neufeld cite over twenty studies 
completed that investigate various individual differences 
that can affect treatment outcomes. In addition, Carrol and 
Maxwell (1979) review many individual differences within 
cognitive abilities. 
Verbal and Visual Cognitive Styles 
One variable that has been studied is verbal and visual 
styles of thinking. Generally, it is assumed that people 
have a style or preference that dominates their way of 
thinking. Katz points out that "due to one's learning 
history one acquires a preference to use imagery regardless 
of task type ••• a predisposition or bias regardless of signs 
regarding the appropriateness of that symbolic system" 
(1983, p. 56). Thus, regardless of the particular 
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situation, people will tend to utilize either a verbalizing 
or visualizing cognitive style. Additionally, Zenhausen 
stated "some people always think in images and either cannot 
think without them ••• or do so with difficulty. Other people 
have either no visual imagery at all when they think, 
or ••• it is merely an accompaniment to their thinking (1978, 
p. 381). 
Richardson defined a verbal cognitive style as a 
"preference for linguistic encoding (labeling or naming) for 
reading the instructions on how to do something rather than 
someone demonstrating the task ••• experience of inner 
speech .•. " (1983, p.12). Richardson defined a preference for 
visualizing as " ••• a preference for visual encoding (i.e., 
the spatial layout and physical features) and attention to 
the sensory properties of the stimulus (i.e., 
color) ••• experience of inner pictures." 
MacInnis and Price differentiate cognitive styles of 
processing on a continuum (1987, p. 425). For verbal 
styles, they included factors such as verbal retrieving, 
cognitive responding and verbal encoding. For visual styles 
they include factors such as sensory representations of 
ideas and feeling. More specifically, MacInnnis and Price 
consider verbalizers to utilize symbolic and language-like 
processing for counter-arguments, attributions, and 
compositional choice strategies. Alternatively, they 
Process Constraint 
consider visualizers to utilize daydreams, fantasies, and 
visual problem solving. 
Similarly, Pavio and Harshman (1987, pp. 78-79) 
describe verbal cognitive styles as "abilities" (i.e., 
fluency and easy of expression, reading ability) and 
"attitudes" (i.e., correctness of verbal expression). 
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Alternatively, they describe visual cognitive styles as 
"habits" (i.e, dreams, daydreams, and use of images to 
solve problems). To summarize, we can conceptualize 
verbalizers as people who utilize verbal representations for 
encoding, might be more likely to engage in compositional 
problem solving techniques, and express themselves verbally. 
We can conceptualize visualizers as people who utilize 
sensory representations for encoding, might be more likely 
to engage in visual problem solving techniques, and have 
daydreams. 
Verbalizing and visualizing cognitive styles have been 
researched with differential treatment effects for anxious 
or phobic individuals. Studies have found that people with 
verbalizing cognitive styles gain more from verbally 
oriented treatments than people with visualizing cognitive 
styles. That is, treatments such as covert reinforcement 
and instructional training which ask people to imagine 
things verbally, or to ask people to rely on speech as 
stimuli are better for "verbalizers" (Delaney, 1978; Tondo & 
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Cautela, 1974; and Vallis & Butcher, 1986). Other clinical 
studies have found that people with visualizing cognitive 
styles gain more from visually oriented treatments than 
people with verbalizing cognitive styles. That is, 
treatments such as systematic desensitization, the use of 
fantasies and covert modeling which ask people to visually 
imagine things or to ask people to rely on visual stimuli 
are better for "visualizers" (Dyckman & Cowan, 1978; Gold, 
Jarvinen, & Teague, 1982; Vallis & Butcher, 1986; Wisocki, 
1973). Basically, treatments that were based on verbal 
representations were more effective on verbalizers than on 
visualizers. Similarly, treatments that were based on 
visual representations were more effective on visualizers 
than on verbalizers. 
The treatments that were derived from the self-
generated attitude change model can be applied to the 
verbalizing and visualizing concepts. That is, the 
treatments of process constraints would seem to interact 
with verbalizing and visualizing cognitive styles. Looking 
closely at the process constraint treatment analogue, it 
would be predicted that verbalizers would benefit from this 
type of intervention. With process constraints, people are 
asked to explain out loud where they think their beliefs 
originate. Thus, the content of the process constraint 
treatment utilizes verbal expression of people's beliefs. 
Process Constraint 
17 
Therefore, people with verbalizing cognitive styles would 
seem to benefit highly from a process constrained treatment. 
In contrast, people with visualizing cognitive styles would 
not seem to benefit highly from a process constrained 
treatment because they utilize visual representations. 
For this study, fear of speaking in front of a group 
was investigated. Two main hypothesis were tested. First, 
it was predicted that people who participate in a process 
constraint treatment analogue would benefit more if they 
were verbalizers than visualizers. Second it was 
hypothesized that there would be no difference in effects 
for people in the control condition. Taking these two 
hypothesis into account, it was expected that there would be 
an interaction between treatment effects and cognitive 
styles. 
Method 
Participants 
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Undergraduates at the University of North Florida were 
recruited for an experiment concerning "people's fears and 
thoughts." Volunteers received extra credit for 
participation. The participants selected had previously 
indicated a strong fear of public speaking. There were 58 
participants included in this experiment (60 participated, 
but only 58 completed the experiment). The participants 
were randomly assigned to conditions with the restriction 
that there were an equal number of verbalizer participants 
and visualizer participants in each condition. 
Procedure 
Assessment of Fear and Cognitive Styles 
Geer Survey Schedule. In an initial screening, 
participants were administered an abbreviated version of the 
Geer Fear Survey Schedule-II (Geer, 1965). The survey is a 
20-item self-report measure. Participants were asked to 
rate on a 7-point scale their fear of situations or objects. 
Participants who reported a strong fear of public speaking 
(i.e., a rating of 5, 6, or 7) were chosen for this study. 
Verbalizer-Visualizer Questionnaire. Participants were 
also given at an initial screening Richardson's Verbalizer-
Visualizer Questionnaire (1977). The Verbalizer-Visualizer 
Questionnaire (VVQ) is a IS-item, true-false, self-report 
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measure. The VVQ measures verbalizing-visualizing thinking 
styles in individuals. Participants were asked to indicate 
if particular activities (e.g., my thinking often consists 
of mental pictures or images, I can easily think of synonyms 
for words) are characteristic of them. Their responses were 
summed across all 15 items. Participants chosen for the 
study were classified as a verbalizer or visualizer by a 
median split of the full range of scores. 
Administration of Treatments Analogues 
Participants were seen individually for one session. 
An experimenter briefly described the procedure and 
rationale of the experiment. The participants were told 
that the experiment was designed to assess new types of 
treatments for people that have a fear of public speaking. 
The experimenter then administered either the process 
constraint treatment analogue or the control condition. 
Process constraint condition. In the process 
constraint condition, participants were asked to verbalize 
for five minutes the reasons for their beliefs about 
speaking before a group. These instructions were similar to 
the instructions given in the Tesser et ale (1978) study. 
For example, participants were asked, "Tell me how you feel 
emotionally and physically when you are about to give a 
speech ••• most importantly, tell me why you feel this 
way ••• in terms of past experiences try to concentrate on why 
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you believe as you do." The experimenter focused the 
participants verbalizations on the derivations of their 
beliefs by using probes (e.g., tell me why you think that). 
Control condition. In the control condition, 
participants were asked to fill out a questionnaire for five 
minutes. The 100-item questionnaire contained different 
issues, objects, and situations. The participants were 
asked to rate on a scale of 1-10 (10 indicating no anxiety 
and 1 indicating extreme anxiety) how much anxiety they 
believed the average person would experience for these 
issues. If the participants finished before the allotted 
five minutes was over, they were asked to review their 
answers. 
At the end of either treatment condition, participants 
underwent a relaxation procedure. The experimenter first 
gave an introduction about the benefits of physical 
relaxation. The experimenter then demonstrated three times 
the deep breathing exercise. Finally, the subjects 
participated in the exercise for 3 minutes. By having both 
groups undergo the relaxation exercise, any differences in 
fear should be attributed to changes in beliefs rather than 
the treatment per se. 
Dependent Variables 
After the relaxation procedure, the participants were 
asked to speak for three minutes to a small group on a 
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preselected innocuous topic (e.g., plans for the summer). 
The group consisted of three assistants (not including the 
experimenter). The range in the ages of the assistants was 
equivalent to the range in ages of the participants. The 
assistants were also dressed in the same manner as the 
participants (i.e., casually). One half the participants 
spoke to a group consisting of two females and one male 
assistant. The other half of the participants spoke to a 
group consisting of one female and two male assistants. All 
the assistants were blind to the treatment condition. 
Self-Generated Responses. Immediately following the 
speech, the participants generated four measures of fear. 
The questionnaire included three scales designed to assess 
the participants' feelings and perceptions about their 
speech. The first scale (measure of fear) asked 
participants to indicate how much fear they experienced 
while giving the speech. Ratings were made on a lOO-point 
scale with 5-point increments marked and anchored with the 
following labels: no fear, slight fear, moderate fear, 
strong fear, and terror. The second scale (measure of 
behavior) asked participants to rate how well they thought 
they were able to give their speech. The ratings were made 
on a series of 7-point semantic-differential type scales 
(i.e., good/bad, valuable/worthless, pleasant/unpleasant, 
positive/negative, nice/awful). The third scale ( measure 
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of beliefs) asked subjects how they might cope with seven 
situations involving a speech (e.g., giving an oral report 
in front of a 90-person class, being asked to give a 
"formal" toast at an acquaintance's wedding, presenting a 
project to supervisors at work, giving an eulogy at 
someone's funeral, being asked to speak in class without 
prior notice, defending ideas in front of a club, giving a 
presentation to a civic group). Participants were asked to 
rate how well they thought they would cope with each of 
these situations on a lOa-point scale with 5-point 
increments with anchors of unable to cope, barely able to 
cope, able to cope pretty well, and completely able to 
cope. 
The fourth scale (physiological measure of fear) was 
measured during the speech using a method described by 
McNair, Droppleman, and Pillard (1967). Palmar sweat was 
measured from the index finger of the participants' 
nondominant hand. A chemically treated paper was wrapped 
around their index finger. 
Palmar sweat stains the chemically treated papers. The 
depth of the stain is an index of the participants' arousal 
(i.e., darker papers indicate higher levels of arousal). To 
score the arousal levels, the palmar sweat papers were 
sorted into five categories form lightest to darkest. There 
was an equal number of palmar sweat papers per category. 
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Each category was assigned a score of 1-5 corresponding from 
the least arousal to the most arousal. 
Rater-Generated Responses. Immediately following the 
speech, the three assistants generated three measures of 
fear on the participants. The assistants were trained to 
focus to on the participants' non-verbal activity (i.e., eye 
contact, posture, facial movements, para-verbal, and body 
movements). After the speech, the assistants rated the 
participants' observable fear and performance during the 
speech using the three scales described under the self 
reported fear. Appropriate word changes reflected the fact 
that the group was rating the participants and not 
themselves. Responses were averaged over each of the three 
members of the group for each participant. 
Post-experimental interview 
After completion of the dependent variables, the 
rationale of the experiment was explained to the 
participants. They were given the opportunity to ask and 
have answered any questions concerning the experiment. 
Participants were asked not to discuss the experiment with 
other potential subjects, and then dismissed. 
Results 
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This experiment utilized a 2 x 2 design. The 
independent variables were treatment condition (analogue 
versus control) and cognitive style (verbalizing versus 
visualizing). Each participant generated four dependent 
measures: extra-laboratory beliefs, self-reported fear, 
physiological arousal, and self-assessed behavior. Another 
set of dependent measures was obtained from the raters' 
assessments of the participants' fear, behavior, and extra-
laboratory expectations. All the dependent measures were 
assessed immediately following the speech with the exception 
of the palmar sweat measure which was assessed during the 
speech. All measures were separately analyzed utilizing a 2 
x 2 ANOVA. Significant interaction effects were further 
analyzed by simple main effects analyses. 
Subjects-Generated Responses 
Beliefs. For the measure of participants' beliefs 
about their ability to cope in extra-laboratory situations, 
the interaction between treatment analogue and cognitive 
style was not significant, ~ (1, 57) < 1.00. The means 
were, in part, ordered as predicted. In the treatment 
condition, subjects had higher expectations about their 
ability to cope if they were verbalizers (M= 53.22) than if 
they were visualizers (M= 48.31). Contrary to predictions, 
subjects in the control condition also had higher 
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expectations about their ability to cope if they were 
verbalizers (M= 45.90) than if they were visualizers (M= 
40.51). The difference in the treatment means and the 
control means were approximately the same. 
Fear. For the self-report measure of fear, the 
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interaction between treatment analogue and cognitive style 
was not significant, F (1, 57) < 1.00. However, the means 
were again ordered as predicted. In the treatment 
condition, subjects reported less fear during the speech if 
they were verbalizers (M= 39.28) than if they were 
visualizers (M= 47.88). In the control condition, subjects 
reported less fear during the speech, if they were 
verbalizers (~= 49.73) than if they were visualizers (~= 
53.18). The difference in the treatment means was greater 
than the control means. 
Palmar Sweat. For the physiological measure of 
arousal, two judges rated the palmar sweat papers. The two 
judges scores were averaged, because the inter-rater 
reliability was adequate (r= .97). For this measure, the 
interaction between treatment analogue and cognitive style 
was significant, F (1, 57) = 7.95, p,< .01. In the 
treatment condition, subjects were less aroused during the 
speech if they were verbalizers (M=2.75) than if they were 
visualizers (M =3.67). This difference is only marginally 
significant, F (1, 57) = 3.41, ~< .07. In the control 
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condition, subjects palmar sweat measure indicated they were 
less nervous if they were visualizers (M= 2.04) than 
verbalizers (3.13), F (1, 57) = 4.84, ~ < .05. 
Behavior. For the self-assessment measure of 
performance, the interaction between treatment analogue and 
cognitive style was not significant, F (1, 57) ~ 1.0. 
However, the means were, in part, ordered as predicted. In 
the treatment condition, subjects assessed their performance 
to be better if they were verbalizers (M= 22.71) than if 
they were visualizers (M= 21.78). Contrary to expectations, 
subjects in the control condition also assessed their 
performance to be better if they were verbalizers (M= 21.63) 
than if they were visualizers (M= 20.64). The difference in 
the treatment means and the control means were 
approximately the same. 
Rater-Generated Responses 
For each rater-generated response, the three raters' 
evaluations were combined so that there was one dependent 
measure for each participant. For each measure, inter-rater 
reliability was determined by coefficient alpha. To obtain 
an overall measure of extra-laboratory beliefs for each 
subject, the seven items in the measure were combined within 
raters, summed across raters, and then divided by seven (a= 
.76). The measure of fear observed by the raters was 
obtained by combining each raters score into one overall 
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score (Q= .83). To obtain an overall behavioral measure, 
the five items' scores for each rater were combined and then 
each of the raters' scores was added together (0=.70). 
Beliefs. For the raters' expectations that subjects 
would be able to cope with extra-laboratory situations, 
there was a significant interaction between treatment 
analogue and cognitive style, F (1,57) =5.21, ~ < .05. In 
the treatment condition, raters expected more effective 
coping from verbalizers (M= 206.33) than from visualizers 
(~= 156.24), ~ (1,57) = 6.62, p < .05. In the control 
condition, there was no significant difference in the 
raters' expectations of verbalizers (~= 184.09) and 
visualizers (~= 198.05), ~ (1, 57) < 1.00. 
Fear. For the raters' evaluation of the participants' 
fear, there was a significant interaction between treatment 
analogue and cognitive style, F (1, 57) = 5.67, p < .05. In 
the treatment condition, raters judged the subjects' fear to 
be lower if they were verbalizers (M= 92.21) than if they 
were visualizers (M= 152.50), F (1,57) = 7.40, ~< .01. In 
the control condition, there was no significant difference 
in the raters' evaluation of fear in verbalizers (M=120.05) 
and visualizers (M= 104.27), F (1, 57) < 1.00. 
Behavior. For the raters' evaluations of the subjects' 
performance, the interaction between treatment analogue and 
cognitive style only approached conventional levels of 
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significance, F (1, 57) = 2.65, ~ < .11. The means, 
however, were ordered as predicted. In the treatment 
condition, raters evaluated the subjects' performance as 
better if they were verbalizers (M= 78.64) than visualizers 
(~66.35), ~ (1, 57) = 5.01, ~ < .05. In the control 
condition, there was no significant difference in the 
raters' evaluation of verbalizers (M= 70.05) and visualizers 
(M=70.64), F (1,57) < 1.00. 
Discussion 
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For this study, two main hypothesis were tested. 
First, it was hypothesized that participants would benefit 
more from treatment if they were verbalizers than 
visualizers. Second, it was hypothesized that there would 
be no differences in effects for participants in the control 
condition. Taken together, it was expected that there would 
be an interaction between treatment effects and cognitive 
styles. 
For the subject-generated responses, the means were, in 
part, ordered as predicted but did not approach significance 
(although the physiological measure was statistically 
significant). That is, the verbalizers in the treatment 
condition indicated they had higher expectations about their 
ability to cope in extra-laboratory situations and assessed 
their performance to be better than visualizers in the 
treatment condition. Additionally, verbalizers in the 
treatment condition reported less fear (from the results of 
the physiological measure) and were less nervous during the 
speech than visualizers in the treatment condition. 
However, there were also differences between the verbalizers 
and visualizers in the control group. 
For the rater-generated responses, the means were 
ordered as predicted and achieved statistical significance. 
That is, raters believed that verbalizers in the treatment 
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condition would be able to cope better in extra-laboratory 
situations, looked less fearful, and performed better than 
visualizers in the treatment condition. For the both the 
subject-generated responses and the rater-generated 
responses, there were no significant differences in 
verbalizers and visualizers in the control condition. 
Alternative Hypothesis 
There are many plausible explanations for the 
discrepancy between the subjects-generated responses and the 
rater-generated responses. One explanation for this 
discrepancy concerns the perspectives of the subjects and 
the raters. For purposes of reference, the subjects had a 
very limited perspective on the evaluation of their 
performance. That is, the only comparative analysis they 
could utilize for this situation was their past 
performances in other situations. On the other hand, the 
raters had a broader perspective on the subjects' 
performances. That is, the raters saw many participants 
speak, perhaps creating a more realistic comparison 
reference of subjects' performances. Thus, it might be 
considered that the subjects were "untrained" for their 
evaluations. 
Another explanation for the discrepancy between the 
subject-generated responses and the rater-generated 
responses concerns the reliability of the measures. For any 
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one score (i.e., the subject's report or one rater's 
report), there is a certain amount of error involved. 
According to the true score model, aggregation of 
evaluations would reduce the amount of error involved. If 
so, the summed raters' responses would be more reliable than 
the subjects' single responses. Thus, it might be considered 
that the rater-generated responses would be a better index 
of the treatment effects than the subject-generated 
responses. 
Finally, another explanation for the discrepancy 
between the subjects-generated responses and the rater-
generated responses, is the sample size. With more 
participants, differences in the subjects-generated 
responses would perhaps become statistically significant 
instead of just approaching significance. More 
participants would add power to the analysis. Thus, given 
that the subjects-generated responses tended to be less 
reliable assessments than the raters-generated responses, 
adding more subjects might increase the reliability of these 
responses. 
Theoretical Comparisons 
There are many apparent similarities between treatment 
analogues from self-generated attitude change and treatments 
from other psychological frameworks. The perspective that 
seems to be most similar to the self-generated attitude 
Process Constraint 
32 
change model is cognitive restructuring. In general, 
cognitive restructuring approaches origins of phobias from 
the angle that peoples' affect and behavior are based on the 
way people cognitively structure their world (Corey, 1986). 
Social anxieties are described as "exaggerated fear of being 
the focus of attention and devaluation by another person or 
persons" (Beck, 1985 p. 150). Nichols (1974) described some 
characteristics of social anxiety such as the perception and 
expectation of disapproving or critical regard by others and 
a tendency to perceive and respond to criticism from others 
which is nonexistent. 
Similarly, self-generated attitude change approaches 
origins of phobias from the angle that with increased 
thought, people's beliefs become increasingly consistent and 
their feelings become polarized. Social anxieties are 
described as negative, polarized attitudes that result from 
irrational beliefs. Tesser et. al. stated "that specific 
content of people's belief systems differ across persons in 
spite of the fact that the derivative process is illogical; 
i.e., there are any number of ways to be wrong" (1978, p. 
273) • 
There seems to be many procedural similarities as well 
as differences in treatments derived from the cognitive 
restructuring model and the self-generated attitude change 
model. In cognitive restructuring, three basic strategies 
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or questions are utilized to help people change their 
beliefs: (1) "What's the evidence?" (2) "What's another way 
of looking at the situation?" and (3) "So what if it 
happens?" (Beck, 1985 pp. 201-209). 
There are many forms of cognitive restructuring. In 
rational emotive therapy (RET), for example, Ellis suggests 
that people ask themselves "why would it emerge as terrible 
as that ..• would it really seem so awful if ••• " (Ellis, 1975 
p. 154). In one way, this procedure is similar to 
constrained thought or process constraints in that both 
approaches seem to explore peoples' beliefs. With process 
constraints, however, people are just asked to think about 
the derivations of their beliefs rather than with the 
inclusion of the "so what if it happens" step. Also, people 
are asked to think about how these beliefs are logically 
related to their feelings and arrive at their own 
conclusions rather than think in a prescribed step. For 
example, with process constraints, there is not a 
"disputing" or "awfu1izing" component which is deemed as 
essential in RET (Corey, 1986 p. 220). With process 
constraints, it would be asked why do you think that? With 
RET, it might be asked why is it terrible and horrible if 
life is not the way you want it to be? 
Another difference between RET and process constraints 
is the structure of the interventions. "RET is highly 
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directive, confrontive ••• and highly didactic" (Corey, 1986 
p. 228). Thus, RET seems to place much control with the 
therapist. In contrast, process constraints seem to place 
much more control with the individual. Therefore, the 
subtle nature of the interventions are different. 
Another form of cognitive restructuring is the se1f-
instructional intervention (Meichenbaum, 1977). Like 
process constraints, Meichenbaum's cognitive restructuring 
is somewhat self-focused. People are taught to modify the 
negative beliefs or internal dialogue they have within 
themselves. Similarly, with process constraints people are 
asked to explore their beliefs. Also, both treatments 
focused on verbalizations of beliefs. 
However, Meichenbaum (1977) suggests rehearsing new 
dialogues in which the therapist says the dialogue and the 
individual just repeats it and then imagines it. The 
individual's coping statements are monitored by the 
therapist throughout the rehearsal and any mistakes are 
corrected by the therapist. Thus, the intervention tends to 
be somewhat directive. With self-generated attitude change, 
a change in beliefs decreases fear through the subjects' 
focusing on the derivations of their beliefs. The mediating 
process is increased thought by the subjects about their 
own beliefs. Thus, the structure of the interventions are 
different. That is, self-instructional interventions are 
Process Constraint 
35 
much more didactic than process constraint interventions. 
Another technique that is similar to process 
constraints is objective countering. Objective countering 
states that "the client's beliefs can be changed if the 
therapist helps accumulate more logic against a thought than 
the client has in support of it~ when the logical evidence 
tips the scales the beliefs will shift" (McMullin, 1986 p. 
41). With objective countering, the individual is asked to 
write down all the logical reasons for the rejections of 
these beliefs. Like process constraints, the identification 
of beliefs is paramount. However, instead of just guiding 
an individual to understanding the logical origins of their 
beliefs as in process constraints, objective countering 
prescribes how it should be done (e.g., examining each 
belief in terms of the principles of inductive and deductive 
logic). Thus, the structure and actual implementation of 
objective countering is much more directive than the 
structure and implementation of treatment analogues derived 
from self-generated attitude change. 
Overall, it appears that there is theoretical agreement 
between self-generated attitude change and cognitive 
restructuring approaches. For example, examination of 
peoples' beliefs are important. There is also agreement that 
affect is dependent on beliefs and that pathological 
behavior and affect is the result of illogical beliefs. 
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However, there are many conceptual and procedural 
differences between self-generated attitude change and 
cognitive restructuring One general difference is the 
amount of directiveness in the interventions. There are also 
differences in how the change in beliefs occurs. Thus, 
there seems to be many researchable similarities and 
differences between the self generated attitude change and 
cognitive restructuring approaches. Some of the speculative 
comparisons between self-generated attitude change model and 
cognitive restructuring might warrant future investigations. 
For instance, a comparison of process constraints, RET, 
self-instructional training, and objective countering might 
highlight the comparative effectiveness of each strategy. 
Additional research might define the precise similarities 
and differences between the processes of self-generated 
attitude change and other treatments. 
Directions for Future Research 
Thus far, in the self-generated attitude change 
research, the combination of reality and process constraints 
have been investigated (Leone, 1984; Leone & Baldwin, 1983; 
Leone et. al., 1983). Further exploration is needed to 
establish whether one treatment analogue alone (process or 
reality constraint), or the combination of both would be the 
most effective in ameliorating fears. Such research is 
currently underway (Leone & Groble, 1989). 
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Another useful study would be a comparison of the 
interaction process and reality constraints with 
verbalizing-visualizing cognitive styles. Such a study 
might compare process and reality constraints and evaluate 
which one is most effective for verbalizers and visualizers. 
It would be predicted that for verbalizers, process 
constraints would be more effective than reality 
constraints. This prediction has a strong basis in that 
verbalizers did indeed benefit more than visualizers from 
the process constraint treatment analogue in this study. 
Similarly, it might be predicted that for visualizers, 
reality constraints might be more effective. This 
prediction assumes that with reality constraints, people 
could check the reality of their distorted visual 
representations. Because reality constraints utilize the 
visual representation of their fear, people who typically 
use visual cognitive styles should benefit from this type of 
intervention. 
Before any exact conclusions can be made about 
cognitive styles, this individual difference variable has to 
be researched further (e.g., what exact processes are 
verbalizers and visualizers utilizing?). Research has 
indicated that verbalizing and visualizing cognitive styles 
may be very flexible depending upon the context of the 
treatment (Akins, Hollandsworth, Alcorn, 1983: Akins, 
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Hollandsworth, & O'Connell, 1982; Stevens & Pfost, 1987) or 
the context of the fear (Lang, Melamed, & Hart, 1970, 
Weerts & Lang, 1978). Obviously, the area of cognitive 
style research needs methodological improvement (e.g., 
extensive refinement of diagnostic evaluations of cognitive 
styles). Before methodological improvement can be completed 
effectively, the theoretical construct of cognitive styles 
needs to be clearly described. 
Another issue is the participant population, In the 
present and previous studies, college participants have been 
included. Some, but perhaps not all, of these participants 
could be considered part of the clinical population. Given 
additional resources, research could be conducted with 
phobic people that have dehabilitating symptoms. Perhaps, 
utilizing a population that is in extreme distress instead 
of a population that is in some distress might yield varied 
results. 
In sum, issues to be explored include comparisons of 
self-generated attitude change treatment analogues to 
treatments from other psychological frameworks and 
comparisons of the different treatment analogues within the 
self-generated attitude change model. Additionally, the 
verbal and visual cognitive styles ought to be studied with 
the process and reality constraints to ascertain interaction 
effects. Finally, this study ought to be replicated with 
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various populations. In conclusion, by matching different 
cognitive styles with different self-generated attitude 
change treatment analogues, an efficient individualized 
treatment package might one day be possible. 
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